Texas style deregulation for coal and uranium for NSW
NSW wants Texas-style energy deregulation — but the one thing that makes Texas work is the one thing Australia has never allowed.
Texas style deregulation for coal and uranium for NSW
Mike Newman wants New South Wales to copy Texas and Florida. The newly appointed One Nation leader for the 2027 state election promises to lift the ban on uranium mining, keep coal-fired power stations running, embrace nuclear energy, abandon renewable energy zones, cut payroll tax and slash business regulation. His pitch is that cheap, reliable energy and lighter government will stop businesses fleeing the state the way they have fled California. The analogy sounds appealing until you examine the ground beneath the ground.
Newman, a former NSW investment commissioner contesting the safe Labor seat of Cessnock in the Hunter Valley, announced the platform alongside Pauline Hanson. He called the planned closure of the Eraring coal-fired power station "economic suicide" and said he would welcome both a nuclear power plant and a nuclear waste facility in the region, subject to consultation. He criticised the "three-eyed fish narrative" on nuclear safety and pointed to his experience with the nuclear supply chain. On tax, One Nation would scrap payroll tax for regional businesses and halve it in Sydney. Renewable energy zones would be "dead and buried in the swamps with the mammoths," as federal colleague Barnaby Joyce put it.
The mechanism rewards landowners, not just the state
The surface appeal is clear enough. NSW faces tight energy supply as coal plants retire and renewable projects encounter planning delays and community opposition. Business surveys consistently cite high energy costs and regulatory burden as competitive handicaps. Texas has enjoyed strong population and business growth, powered by abundant energy and lighter regulation. People have indeed moved from high-tax, high-regulation states to lower-cost ones. Yet the mechanism that makes Texas work is not simply "deregulation." It is the alignment of incentives created by private mineral ownership.
In Texas, the surface owner typically holds the subsurface rights. When an energy company wants to drill, it negotiates directly with the landowner, who receives substantial royalties. This turns farmers and ranchers into willing participants rather than opponents. The result is rapid exploration, quicker development and a broad distribution of wealth across rural communities. Local consent is purchased through contracts, not granted through bureaucratic approval. That system has underpinned the shale revolution and kept Texas electricity prices structurally lower than California's.
Local consent is purchased through contracts, not granted through bureaucratic approval.
Crown ownership changes behaviour at every link in the chain
Australia operates on the opposite principle. Minerals are the property of the Crown. Exploration licences are issued by government, not negotiated with freehold owners. Royalties flow to the state treasury, not the paddock. Landholders can receive some compensation for disruption and may negotiate access agreements, but they do not capture the resource rent. This changes behaviour at every link in the chain. Companies spend more time and money on government approvals and political risk management. Rural communities often see mining as a cost imposed from outside rather than a shared economic opportunity. Disputes over land use become fights between locals and the state rather than commercial transactions.
The difference is not trivial. It explains why coal seam gas development met such fierce resistance in NSW compared with parts of Queensland where landholder benefits were clearer. It also explains why uranium mining remains banned in the state despite Australia being a major uranium exporter. Lifting that ban and streamlining approvals could attract some investment, particularly if paired with nuclear power liberalisation at the federal level. Yet the revenue would still accrue to the public purse, not the people living atop the deposits. The political economy remains one of government allocating rights and capturing rents, not private owners driving discovery.
Nuclear requires Canberra to move, not just Macquarie Street
Nuclear adds another layer. Australia's prohibition on nuclear power generation sits at the federal level, not in Macquarie Street. Any serious move toward reactors would require changes in Canberra as well as Sydney. The safety record of modern nuclear engineering is strong, and Australia already manages the front end of the fuel cycle by exporting uranium. As earlier analysis in these pages has noted, the current position, profits from selling uranium abroad while refusing to use the technology at home, lacks a coherent basis in either safety or environmental outcomes. But reversing it demands more than state-level deregulation. It requires public confidence that waste and proliferation risks are managed at least as competently as they are in countries already operating reactors.
One Nation is right that energy costs matter for manufacturing and regional economies. The Hunter has lost industrial momentum as traditional sectors contract. Newman's suggestion that train manufacturing could be delivered more cheaply through foreign partnership rather than a $12 billion taxpayer commitment highlights a legitimate debate about value for money in government industry policy. Yet the broader platform treats symptoms, high taxes, slow approvals, ideological energy targets, without addressing the deeper institutional mismatch with the Texas model.
Royalty reform, not rhetoric, is the actual lever
Government ownership of resources is not inherently disastrous. It has delivered substantial royalty revenue that funds hospitals, schools and infrastructure. But it dulls the sharp price signals that private ownership sends to both producers and surface right holders. The result is slower adaptation, greater political interference and more frequent standoffs between miners, farmers and environmental groups. Texas largely avoids those standoffs because the money flows locally and immediately.
NSW can pursue cheaper energy without pretending it is Texas. That would mean transparent royalty arrangements that give landholders a meaningful share, faster and more predictable approval processes based on evidence rather than politics, and an honest national conversation about nuclear power that moves beyond slogans. It would mean recognising that coal will remain part of the mix for longer than some want, while still preparing for the technologies that follow. Slogans about becoming Florida or Texas substitute for that harder work. They make for good campaign lines in Cessnock but do not alter the incentive structure that actually governs resource extraction in this country.
The coming state election will test whether voters want rhetorical transplants or policies built for Australian realities. Energy security and cost are real problems. Pretending they can be solved by copying the surface features of a jurisdiction whose underlying property rights are fundamentally different risks delivering neither the boom nor the relief that has been promised.
Sources
ABC News — One Nation's nuclear plans for NSW to become more like Texas and Florida
The Bearing — Australia's nuclear hypocrisy: we ban it at home but profit from selling it abroad
Frequently Asked Questions
Why can't NSW just copy Texas's energy model?
The Texas model works because landowners hold the mineral rights beneath their property and receive direct royalties when energy companies drill — creating immediate financial incentives for local communities to support extraction. In NSW, minerals belong to the Crown, royalties flow to the state treasury, and landholders receive only limited compensation for disruption, which means the community incentive structure is fundamentally different regardless of how approvals are streamlined.
Who owns minerals in Australia — the landowner or the government?
In Australia, subsurface minerals are owned by the Crown — that is, the state government — not the freehold landowner. Companies must obtain exploration licences from government rather than negotiating directly with the people whose land sits above the resource, which concentrates royalty revenue in the public purse rather than distributing it to local communities.
Can NSW legalise nuclear power on its own?
No. The prohibition on nuclear power generation is a federal law, not a NSW one, so any serious move toward reactors requires changes in Canberra as well as Sydney. State-level policy announcements on nuclear can set a political direction but cannot by themselves authorise the construction or operation of a reactor.
Why did coal seam gas face more opposition in NSW than Queensland?
The article identifies the difference in landholder benefit arrangements as a key factor: in parts of Queensland, landholders received clearer financial benefits from coal seam gas development, making local communities more willing participants. In NSW, under Crown mineral ownership, communities more often experienced extraction as something imposed from outside rather than a shared economic opportunity.
What would actually make resource extraction work better in NSW?
The core reform needed is giving landholders a meaningful direct share of royalties from extraction on their land, combined with faster and more evidence-based approval processes. Without changing the incentive structure so that local communities capture some of the resource rent, streamlining approvals alone is likely to produce political friction rather than the broad-based regional economic growth seen in private-ownership jurisdictions like Texas.